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The unbiasedness hypothesis -- the joint hypothesis of uncovered interest parity (UIP) and
rational expectations --  has been almost universally rejected in studies of exchange rate
movements. In contrast to previous studies, which have used short-horizon data, we test this
hypothesis using interest rates on longer-maturity bonds for the G-7 countries. The results of
these long-horizon regressions are much more positive — all of the coefficients on interest
differentials are of the correct sign, and almost all are closer to the predicted value of unity
than to zero. We first appeal to an econometric interpretation of the results, which focuses on
the presence of simultaneity in a cointegration framework. We then use a macroeconomic
model to provide an economic explanation for the differences between the short- and long-
horizon results. Regressions run on model-generated data replicate the important regularities
in the actual data, including the sharp differences between short- and long-horizon parameters.
In the short run, the failure of the unbiasedness proposition results from the interaction of
stochastic exchange market shocks with endogenous monetary policy reactions. In the long
run, in contrast, exchange rate movements are driven by the “fundamentals,” leading to a
relationship between interest rates and exchange rates that is more consistent with UIP.
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Few propositions are more widely accepted in international economics than that the
“unbiasedness hypothesis” -- the joint hypothesis of uncovered interest parity (UIP) and rational
expectations -- is at best a poor, and often perverse, predictor of future exchange rate movements.
In a survey of 75 published estimates, Froot (1990) reports few cases where the sign of the
coefficient on interest rate differentials in exchange rate prediction equations is consistent with the
unbiasedness hypothesis, and not a single case where it exceeds the theoretical value of unity. This
resounding unanimity on the failure of the predictive power of interest differentials must be
virtually unique in the empirical literature in economics.
A notable aspect of almost all published studies, however, is that the unbiasedness
hypothesis has been tested using financial instruments with relatively short maturities, generally of
12 months or less. There appear to be (at least) three reasons for this practice. The first is
constraints on sample size, given that generalized exchange rate floating began only in the early
1970s. This was particularly problematic in the early 1980s, when the floating-rate period was
shorter than the maturity of longer-dated financial instruments. The second is that longer-term,
fixed-maturity interest rate data were difficult to obtain. The third reason is that some pioneering
studies were also concerned with testing the hypothesis of covered interest parity, which required
observations on forward exchange rates of the same maturity as the associated financial asset. In
the event, relatively thick forward exchange markets only exist to a maximum horizon of
12 months.
Fortunately, the length of the floating-rate period is now much longer than when the initial
studies were performed, and the availability of data on yields of comparable longer-dated
instruments across countries has increased. Accordingly, this paper tests the unbiasedness
hypothesis using instruments of considerably longer maturity than those employed in past studies.
Our results for the exchange rates of the major industrial countries differ strikingly from those
obtained using shorter horizons. For instruments with maturities ranging from 5 to 10 years, all of
the coefficients on interest rate differentials in the unbiasedness regressions are of the correct sign.
Furthermore, almost all of the coefficients on interest rates are closer to the predicted value of
unity than to the zero coefficient implied by the random walk hypothesis. Finally, as the “quality”
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of the bond yield data in terms of their consistency with the requirements underlying UIP
increases, the estimated parameters typically become closer to those implied by the unbiasedness
hypothesis.
To explain the apparently anomalous differences in tests of the unbiasedness hypothesis
using short- and long-horizon data, we develop a small macroeconomic model that extends the
framework of McCallum (1994a). In particular, a more general monetary reaction function is
incorporated that causes interest rates to respond to innovations in output and inflation, as
opposed to the exchange-rate targeting framework used by McCallum. Stochastic simulations of
the model based are used to generate a synthetic database for replicating unbiasedness tests.
Standard regressions using these synthetic data yield negative coefficients on short-term interest
rates of roughly the same magnitude as found in most short-horizon studies, thus the model can
explain the “forward discount bias” found in such studies. Long-horizon regressions, in contrast,
yield coefficients close to unity, consistent with our estimation results using actual data. The long-
horizon results differ sharply from the short-horizon results because the model’s “fundamentals”
play a more important role in tying down exchange rate movements over longer horizons. More
generally, the data generated by the simulations for the endogenous variables mimic remarkably
closely the key properties of actual data for the G-7 countries.
The paper is structured as follows. Section II reviews the unbiasedness hypothesis,
summarizes the existing evidence over short horizons, and provides updated results from 1980
through early 1998. Section III presents estimates of the unbiasedness hypothesis using data on
government bond yields for the G-7 countries. Section IV provides an econometric rationalization
for the results that are obtained, while Section V develops a model that is consistent with the key
features of the observed data and the econometric explanation. Section VI provides concluding
remarks.
II.  A REVIEW OF THE UIP HYPOTHESIS AND SHORT-HORIZON EVIDENCE
It is convenient to introduce notation and concepts by starting with the covered interest
parity (CIP) condition, which follows from the assumption of arbitrage between spot and forward
foreign exchange markets. If the conditions for risk-free arbitrage exist, the ratio of the forward to
1 These conditions include identical default risk and tax treatment, the absence of
restrictions on foreign ownership, and negligible transactions costs.
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the spot exchange rate will equal the interest differential between assets with otherwise similar
characteristics measured in local currencies.1 Algebraically, CIP can be expressed as:
where St is the price of foreign currency in units of domestic currency at time t, Ft,t+k is the
forward value of S for a contract expiring k periods in the future, It,k is one plus the k-period yield
on the domestic instrument, and I*t,k is the corresponding yield on the foreign instrument. Taking
logarithms of both sides (indicated by lower-case letters), equation (1) becomes:
Equation (2) is a risk-free arbitrage condition that holds regardless of investor preferences.
To the extent that investors are risk averse, however, the forward rate can differ from the 
expected future spot rate by a premium that compensates for the perceived riskiness of holding
domestic versus foreign assets. We define the risk premium, 0, accordingly:
ft,t%k ' s
e
t,t%k % 0t,t%k . (3)
Substituting equation (3) into (2) then allows the expected change in the exchange rate from
period t to period t+k be expressed as a function of the interest differential and the risk premium:
)s et,t%k ' (it,k & i
(
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Narrowly defined, UIP refers to the proposition embodied in equation (4) when the risk
premium is zero—consistent, for instance, with the assumption of risk-neutral investors. In this
case, the expected exchange rate change equals the current interest differential. Equation (4) is
2 Indirect tests of UIP have been performed using surveys of published forecasts of
exchange rates. Chinn and Frankel (1994a,b) find mostly positive correlations between the
forward discount and the expected depreciation, which is consistent with UIP. 
3 This condition is also sometimes referred to as the “risk-neutral efficient markets
hypothesis.” In the absence of risk neutrality, market efficiency does not require that the
forward exchange rate equals its expected future level. Tests of this more general version of
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not directly testable, however, in the absence of observations on market expectations of future
exchange rate movements.2 To operationalize the concept, UIP is generally tested jointly with the
assumption of rational expectations in exchange markets. In this case, future realizations of st+k
will equal the value expected at time t plus a white-noise error term >t,t+k that is uncorrelated with
all information known at t, including the interest differential and the spot exchange rate:
where sret,t+k is the rational expectation of the exchange rate at time t+k formed in time t.
Substituting equation (5) into (4) gives the following relationship:3
where the left-hand side of equation (6) is the realized change in the exchange rate from t to t+k.
It is natural, then, to test the composite “unbiasedness” hypothesis of UIP and rational
expectations via the regression equation:
Under the assumption that the composite error term ,t,t+k is orthogonal to the interest differential,
the estimated slope parameter in equation (7) should be unity. In addition, no other regressors
known at time t should have explanatory power, as all available information should be captured in
4 As noted in Engel (1996), however, a constant term due to Jensen’s inequality is
likely to be small in practice.
5 Other recent surveys that report similar results include MacDonald and Taylor
(1992), Isard (1995) and Lewis (1995). A qualified exception is the study by Flood and Rose
(1996), which finds that the coefficient on the interest differential is closer to its UIP value
during periods when exchange rate realignments within the ERM were expected (and
observed).
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the rational expectation of )st,t+k as reflected in the period-t interest differential. Regarding the
constant term, non-zero values may still be consistent with UIP. Jensen’s inequality, for instance,
implies that the expectation of a ratio is not the same as the ratio of the expectations (see
Meese,1989).4 Alternatively, relaxing the assumption of risk-neutral investors, the constant term
may reflect a constant risk premium demanded by investors on foreign versus domestic assets.
Default risk could play a similar role, although the latter possibility is less familiar because tests of
UIP (as well as CIP) generally use returns on assets issued in offshore markets by borrowers with
comparable credit ratings. In contrast, the long-term government bonds used for estimation in
Section III may not share the same default attributes, so that a pure default risk premium might
exist.
As noted above, estimates of equation (7) using values for k that range up to one year
resoundingly reject the unbiasedness restriction on the slope parameter. The survey by
Froot (1990), for instance, finds an average estimate for $ of -0.88.5 Thus, the common
perception that the failure of UIP indicates that short-run exchange rate movements are best
characterized as a random walk is not strictly true: over short horizons, most studies find that
exchange rates move inversely with interest differentials.
To illustrate the dismal performance of short-horizon interest rates as predictors for
movements in the exchange rates of the G-7 countries, Table 1 presents estimates of equation (7)
for the period from the first quarter of 1980 to the first quarter of 1998. The exchange rates of the
other six countries were expressed in terms of U.S. dollars, and the 3-, 6-, and 12-month
movements in exchange rates were regressed against differentials in eurocurrency yields of the
6 Yields and exchange rates were both constructed as the average of bid and offer rates
on the last trading day of each quarter. Exchange rate movements and interest differentials are
expressed at annual rates.
7 Although one cannot formally test the null of a zero coefficient, since the standard
errors are constructed under the null hypothesis that $=1.
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corresponding maturity.6 Estimation using the 6- and 12-month horizon data at a quarterly
frequency led to overlapping observations, inducing (under the rational expectations null
hypothesis) moving average (MA) terms in the residuals. Following Hansen and Hodrick (1980),
we used the Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) estimator of Hansen (1992) to correct the
standard errors of the parameter estimates for moving average serial correlation of order k-1 (i.e.,
MA(1) in the case of 6-month data and MA(3) in the case of 12-month data).
The results confirm the failure of UIP over short horizons, similar to other studies. At
each horizon, four of the six estimated coefficients have the “wrong” sign relative to the
unbiasedness hypothesis. The average coefficient is around -0.8, similar to the value in the survey
by Froot (1990). Panel estimation with slope coefficients constrained to be identical across
countries yields estimates ranging from about -0.6 at the 6-month horizon to -0.3 at the 12-month
horizon. In most cases it is possible to reject the hypothesis that $ equals unity; in cases where
UIP cannot be rejected, the standard errors of the estimated parameters are sufficiently large that
it would be difficult to reject almost any plausible hypothesis.Only for the lira is it possible to
reject the random-walk model while not also rejecting UIP.7  All of the adjusted R2 statistics (not
reported) are very low, and occasionally negative.
In Figure 1, recursive coefficient estimates for $ are displayed for all six exchange rates. It
is clear that some point estimates wander considerably (Canadian dollar, Deutschemark), while
others do not. In particular, the point estimate for the lira appears consistently positive. Another
interesting result is obtained if one breaks the 1980Q1-1998Q1 sample at 1979Q4/1980Q1; the
UK point estimate for the latter subsample is positive, while it is negative in the early subsample. 
8 The serial correlation problem becomes a potentially serious issue as the number of
overlapping observations increases rapidly with the instrument maturity. One way to
overcome the problem is to use only non-overlapping data; however, this procedure amounts
to throwing away information. Boudoukh and Richardson (1994) argue that, depending upon
the degree of serial correlation of the regressor and the extent of the overlap, using
(continued...)
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III.  LONG-HORIZON ESTIMATES
As noted in the introduction, short-horizon tests of the unbiasedness hypothesis have been
facilitated by the availability of interest rate series that correspond closely to the requirements for
covered interest parity. Data of comparable quality for longer-horizon instruments generally are
much less readily available. In particular, it is difficult to obtain longer-term rates in offshore
markets on thickly-traded instruments of a known fixed maturity. For the purposes of this study,
then, we have used data that are inherently somewhat less pure from the point of view of the UIP
hypothesis. Specifically, we have used domestic yields on government bonds of maturities that
correspond roughly, but not necessarily exactly, to assumed constant maturities. Moreover these
on-shore instruments may be subject to differences in tax regime, capital controls, etc.
Nonetheless, based on the findings by Popper (1993) that covered interest differentials at long
maturities are not appreciably greater than those for short (up to one year) maturities, we do not
expect that rejections of long-horizon UIP will be driven by deviations from covered interest
parity. 
Even if these data tend to exhibit more “noise” than those used for short-horizon tests of
UIP, for conventional errors-in-variables reasons we would expect the coefficient on the interest
differential in these long-horizon regressions to be biased toward zero, and away from its
hypothesized value of unity. Hence, the results we obtain should be conservative in nature.
The first data set we employ to test long-horizon unbiasedness consists of the benchmark
government bond yields used by Edison and Pauls (1993), provided by Hali Edison. These are
end-of-month yields on outstanding government bonds for the G-7 countries, generally of 10-year
maturity at the date of issuance. The 10-year change in the exchange rate versus the dollar for the
other six currencies is then regressed on the 10-year lagged differential in the associated bond
yield.8  Given that floating rates were generally introduced in 1973, after allowing for the 10-year
8(...continued)
overlapping data is equivalent to using between 3 to 4.5 times the number of observations
available otherwise.
9 These are fixed effects regressions which allow for a different constant across
currencies. The standard errors are constructed to allow for cross-currency correlations, as
well as serial correlation due to overlapping horizons. See Frankel and Froot (1987) for
details.
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lag on the interest differential, the available estimation period consisted of 1983Q1–1998Q1
(given limitations on the availability of bond yield data for Italy, the sample period for the lira
begins in1985Q1).
The results of these regressions are reported in the first panel of Table 3. They represent a
surprising and stark contrast to the short-horizon results reported in Section II. In all cases, the
estimated slope coefficient is positive, with four of the six values lying closer to unity than to
zero. For the Canadian dollar, the point estimate (1.104) is very close to unity, while the
deutschemark and the franc also evidence high coefficients. The yen, pound and lira are the three
cases in which UIP is statistically rejected. But for all currencies except the lira, the hypothesis
that $ equals zero can also be strongly rejected. The adjusted R2 statistics are also typically higher
than in a typical short-horizon regressions, with the proportion of the explained variance in the
deutschemark and the pound approaching one half.
Since there are relatively few independent observations in the single-currency regressions,
additional power can be obtained by pooling the data and constraining the slope coefficient to be
the same across currencies.9 The resulting point estimate is reported under the entry “constrained
panel” at the bottom of Table 2.a. Its value of 0.645 is well below unity; on the other hand, it is
closer to unity than to zero, a substantial difference from the panel estimates obtained for horizons
up to one year reported in Table 1.
For Japan, Germany, the U.K., and the U.S., it was also possible to obtain synthetic
“constant maturity” 10-year yields from interpolations of the yield curve of outstanding
government securities. The regressions using measures of long-horizon interest differentials based
on these data are reported in Table 2.b. For each of the three associated exchange rates, the
estimated slope parameter is closer to unity than in the regressions using benchmark yields
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(although the difference is slight for the deutschemark). Moreover, the panel point estimate of
0.708 is also closer to the posited value. The improvement in the results, although modest,
suggests that part of the reason why unbiasedness is still rejected when using benchmark yields
relates to discrepancies between the assumed and actual maturities of the outstanding securities.
In other words, improvements in the quality of the data appear to systematically shift the results
toward supporting the UIP hypothesis.
Similar constant-maturity 5-year yields were obtained for Germany, the U.K., Canada, and
the U.S. Regressions of 5-year changes in exchange rates on the interest differentials implied by
these data are reported in Table 2.c. The results are even more favorable for the UIP hypothesis:
for both the deutschemark and the pound, the slope coefficients are economically and statistically
indistinguishable from the implied value of unity, while the null of zero under the random walk
hypothesis is strongly rejected. In the case of the Canadian dollar, the point estimate is 1.34, but
the 50 percent confidence bound for the point estimate easily encompasses the value of unity.
Similarly, the panel estimate is essentially equal to the theoretically implied value.
The only other studies that we are aware of that test the unbiasedness hypothesis over
horizons of longer than 12 months are Flood and Taylor (1997), and Alexius (1999). Flood and
Taylor regress 3-year changes in exchange rates on annual average data on medium-term
government bonds from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS). The data over the
1973–92 period are then  pooled for a sample of 21 countries. They find a coefficient on the
interest differential of 0.596 with a standard error of 0.195. Thus the hypotheses that $ equals
either zero or unity can both be rejected. These results are broadly in line with our 10-year results,
although our 5-year results using constant maturity data are more supportive of the unbiasedness
hypothesis. This difference may reflect the fact that our end-period, constant-maturity data are
more closely aligned with the requirements underlying the UIP hypothesis, although differences in
country coverage and sample periods may also play a role.
In the study by Alexius, 14 long term bond rates (of uncertain maturities) for the 1957Q1-
199Q4 period are drawn from IFS. She attempts to control for the measurement error arising
10 The IFS data are somewhat problematic in that the definitions of the long term
bonds is not homogeneous across countries, and change at certain times. 
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from uncertain maturities, and the role of coupon payments.10 Her study also finds substantial
evidence in favor of the unbiasedness hypothesis at long horizons. For the deutschemark, the OLS
point estimate for the duration- and coupon-adjusted series is 0.820, which is remarkably close to
our estimate of 0.836 for the 10 year constant maturity yields. On the other hand, her estimates
for the yen and the pound (0.209 and 0.278, respectively) are somewhat lower than the estimates
we report in Table 2.b of 0.564 and 0.719. Some of this difference may be due to the longer
sample she uses, which encompasses a period of substantial capital controls.
In any event, it is reassuring that the Flood and Taylor and Alexius results are similar to
those obtained in our regressions, suggesting that the difference between short- and long-horizon
tests of UIP may be robust across countries, sample periods and estimation procedures.
IV.  EXPLAINING THE RESULTS ECONOMETRICALLY  
The rather strikingly different results obtained at different horizons should be placed in the
context of recent findings that when the unbiasedness proposition is couched in terms of
cointegrating relationships, one finds that it is much more difficult to reject the null hypothesis of
unbiasedness (e.g., Evans and Lewis, 1995). Here, we are not so much concerned with the
specific finding regarding cointegration with the posited values, but rather the econometric
implications of estimating equation (7). If the expected spot and forward rate are cointegrated,
then according to the Engle-Granger Representation Theorem, one can re-write the cointegrated
system as:
where the forward rate horizon has been set to one (k = 1) for simplicity. As pointed out by
Phillips (1991), single-equation estimation of (8.a) is plagued by asymptotic bias as long as the
forward rate is not weakly exogenous. To see how this relates to the conventional depreciation-
11 Although it is common to impose the zero constant in a joint test of the coefficients,
Brenner and Kroner (1995) have shown that when the (log) spot and forward rates follow
continuous time random walk processes, then there will be a constant in the cointegrating
relationship even under the risk neutral assumption. This constant will be a function of the
drift term and the variance of innovations in the underlying process driving the spot rate.
12 In principle, either specification is valid asymptotically. Zivot (1997) argues for
testing the cointegrating vector involving the contemporaneous forward and spot rate, while
Villanueva (1998) reports results demonstrating that lagged forecast errors yield more
unambiguous results.
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forward discount regression in (7), consider that the forward rate must be cointegrated with the
contemporaneous spot rate if it is cointegrated with the future spot rate. Following Moore (1994),
rewrite (8.a), assuming weak exogeneity of f (M2 = 0)
where bi and ci are functions of the variances and covariances of ,1 and ,2, and u is a function of
,1 and ,2, and their variances and covariances. In particular, b0 = F12/F22 , which equals zero only
when the correlation between the ,’s is zero. Imposing the restrictions *0 = 0 and *1 = 1 in the
cointegrating vector,11 equation (9) can be rewritten as:
Notice that equation (10) degenerates to equation (7) if and only if b0 = 0, bi = ci = 0 for all i, and
*1 = 1 (Moore, 1994; Villanueva, 1998). 
To examine whether the standard assumption of weak exogeneity of the forward rate is
justified at either the short or long horizons, we generate implicit forward rates using the exact
relationship in equation (1), for both the 3 month and 5 year horizons.  We then test for
cointegration between the forward rate and the future spot rate12 using the Johansen (1988)
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maximum likelihood procedure. The results are reported in Table 3; in Panel 3.a are the
cointegration results for the 3 month forward rates and the future spot rates, and in Panel 3.b are
the corresponding results for the 5 year implicit forward rates. 
The first column displays the likelihood ratio for the Maximal Eigenvalue statistic. The 5%
critical value for rejecting the null hypothesis of no cointegrating vectors in favor of the
alternative of one  is 15.41. The lira, yen and pound clearly evidence cointegration, while the franc
test statistic is borderline significant.  In the second and third columns, *0 is the constant in the
cointegrating vector, and *1 is the slope coefficient. Under the maintained hypothesis of long run
unbiasedness,  *1 = 1. The results indicate that for the yen, pound, franc and lira, the spot rate
responds to the lagged error correction term. For the lira, yen and pound, the forward rate also
responds. Among the cases for which cointegration is detected, only the franc exhibits weak
exogeneity of the forward rate. Interestingly, this is a case for which the 3 month forward rate is
not an unbiased predictor of the future spot rate.
For the 5 year implicit forwards and the corresponding future spot rates, borderline
cointegration is detected for the pound, and somewhat less evidence is detected for the
deutschemark. The Canadian sample is much shorter than that for the other currencies, so we are
not able to find formal evidence of cointegration. Interestingly, for the pound, one obtains the
result that at horizons of 5 years, the spot rate responds to the lagged cointegrating vector M1
with high statistical significance, while the forward rate does not. That is, long term interest rate
differentials are weakly exogenous in this system.
Unfortunately, the cointegration evidence for the deutschemark is weaker. If one uses the
more powerful Horvath-Watson (1995) test, which imposes the *1 = 1 restriction, one finds that
test statistic of 4.52 is less than the 10% critical value of 8.30 for the case with a nonzero mean in
the variables (although it is only slightly less than the corresponding critical value of 4.73 for the
less relevant zero-mean case). If one were willing to impose the prior of cointegration (see
Kremers, Ericsson and Dolado, 1992), then the t-statistic on M1 is 1.87, while that on M2 is only
1.00. The data thus seem to suggest that the 5 year deutschemark forward rate is weakly
exogenous. 
13 The Canadian constant 5 year maturity yield series begins only in1980Q4. Another
interesting aspect of the Canadian dollar is the large Canada-US interest differential which
appeared in 1990 with the collapse of the Meech Lake accords, and disappears in 1997 (see
Clinton, 1998).
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For the Canadian dollar, no evidence of cointegration can be detected. The results in the
Panel 3.b are for the Horvath-Watson regressions where the null of long run unbiasedness is
imposed. The spot rate appears to be more responsive to the forward forecast error than the
forward rate. However, these latter results are merely suggestive because we are not able to
detect cointegration in the (admittedly short) sample we have.13
For two of the three currencies for which we have data, it appears that the forward rate is
weakly exogenous at long horizons, while at short horizons the spot rate is more likely to be
weakly exogenous. From a purely statistical standpoint, this explains some of the differences in
the results obtained at short and long horizons. The challenge then remains to determine an
economic reason why this should be the case.
IV.  A MACROECONOMIC INTERPRETATION  
Here, we propose a solution to the unbiasedness puzzle based on the properties of a small
macroeconomic model that incorporates feedback mechanisms between exchange rates, inflation,
output, and interest rates. In particular, the model generates simulated data that are fully
consistent with the stylized facts: that regressions using short-horizon data yield negative slope
coefficients and explain little if any of the variance in exchange rates, while long-horizon
regressions yield coefficients close to unity and explain a much higher proportion of exchange rate
movements.
The model is in the spirit of the framework outlined in McCallum (1994a), but allows for a
richer interaction between interest rates and exchange rates. Stochastic simulations of the model
are performed to generate a synthetic database, which is then used to replicate standard short- and
long-horizon tests of UIP. The regressions using the synthetic data are similar to those obtained
using actual data for the G-7 countries, with a pronounced difference between the short- and
long-horizon parameter estimates. In the short run, shocks in exchange markets lead to monetary
14 He also allows for first-order autocorrelation in 0. In this case, the parameter on the
interest rate becomes (D-F)/8, which McCallum argues will also be negative for plausible
parameter values.
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policy responses that result in a negative correlation between exchange rates and interest rates,
contrary to the unbiasedness hypothesis under UIP. Over the longer term, in contrast, exchange
rates and interest rates are determined by the macroeconomic “fundamentals” of the model, and
thus behave in manner more consistent with the conventional UIP relationship.
McCallum’s framework is based on a two-equation system consisting of an uncovered
interest parity relationship augmented by a monetary reaction function that causes interest rates to
move in response to exchange rate changes:
)s et,t%1 ' (it&i
(
t ) & 0t
(it&it) ' 8 )st % F(it&1&i
(
t&1) % Tt ,
where it -it
* represents the interest differential, 0t is a stochastic shock to the uncovered interest
parity condition, and Tt is an interest rate shock. McCallum is agnostic about the nature of the
factors that underly 0. We follow the same convention, simply calling it for the time being an
“exchange market” shock. McCallum solves this model to show that the parameter on the interest
rate in the reduced-form expression for the change in the next-period exchange rate is -F/8, which
will be negative given conventional parameter values.14
The applicability of McCallum’s interest rate reaction function has been criticized by Mark
and Wu (1996), who find a value of 8 that is small and insignificant for Germany, Japan, and the
U.K. More generally, his reaction function does not incorporate variables that are usually believed
to be of concern to policymakers, such as inflation and output. In this sense, McCallum’s model
does not provide a complete characterization of macroeconomic interactions, but serves the
narrower purpose of illustrating how a negative correlation between interest rates and exchange
rate movements might be generated in a consistent framework.
15 These responses are broadly consistent with the average values across the G-7
countries embodied in MULTIMOD, the IMF’s macroeconomic simulation model (Masson,
Symansky, and Meredith (1990)).
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To generalize McCallum’s model, and allow a richer characterization of the feedback
process between interest rates and exchange rates, we extend it by including equations for output
and inflation. The monetary reaction function is then specified so that interest rates adjust in
response to movements in output and inflation, using the rule proposed by Taylor (1993). To the
extent that output and inflation are affected by the exchange rate, interest rates will still respond
to innovations in the disturbance in the UIP relationship, but through a less direct channel than
originally posited by McCallum. The model is described in Table 4, where the variables are
interpreted as being measured relative to those in the partner country against which the exchange
rate is defined—in this case, the United States. The periodicity is assumed to be annual, and all
variables are expressed at annual rates.
The inflation equation is an expectations-augmented Phillips curve: current period inflation
adjusts in response to past inflation, expected future inflation, the current output gap, and the
current change in the real exchange rate. The theoretical justification for this type of equation is
discussed in Chadha, Masson, Meredith (1993). Parameter values have been chosen to be broadly
consistent with the empirical evidence using panel data for the G-7 countries. The output equation
is a standard open-economy IS curve, where output responds to the real exchange rate, the
expected long-term real interest rate, and the lagged output gap. The parameters have been
chosen such that a 10 percent appreciation in the real exchange rate reduces output by 1 percent
in the first year, and by 2 percent in the long run; a 1 percentage point rise in the real interest rate
lowers output by ½ percent in the first year and 1 percent in the long run.15 The long-term interest
rate is determined as the average of the current short-term interest rate and its expected value
over the four subsequent periods—thus, the long-term rate can be thought of as a five-year bond
yield that is determined by the expectations theory of the term structure. Expected long-term
inflation is defined similarly in constructing the real long-term interest rate.
Stochastic elements are introduced via three processes, all of which are assumed to be
white noise: exchange market shocks (0t), inflation shocks (<t), and output shocks (,t).  We
16 The performance of this algorithm is compared with that of other forward-looking
solution methods in Juillard, Laxton, McAdam, and Pioro (1998). The simulations were
performed using Portable Troll version 1.031. Data and programs are available on request
from the authors.
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characterize the solution using numerical simulations based on the stacked-time algorithm for
solving forward-looking models described in Armstrong, Black, Laxton, and Rose (1998).16 An
important feature of the solution path is that expectations are consistent with the model’s
prediction for future values of the endogenous variables, based on available information about the
stochastic processes. As the innovation terms 0t, <t, and ,t are assumed to be independent and
uncorrelated, the information set consists of the contemporaneous innovations as well as the
lagged values of the endogenous variables. At any point in time, the conditional expectation of the
future values of the innovations is zero given the assumption that they are white noise. In this
sense, expectations are fully rational given the model structure. Nevertheless, agents lack perfect
foresight, because they cannot anticipate the sequence of future innovations that determine the
realizations of the endogenous variables. As the innovations are white noise, so are the associated
expectational errors.
The only other information needed to perform the simulations is the relative variance of
the three stochastic processes. These were chosen to yield simulated variances of exchange rates,
inflation, and output that are consistent with the stylized facts for the G-7 countries. Specifically,
the standard deviation of the year-to-year movement in the exchange rate, averaged across the G-
7 countries (excluding the U.S., the numeraire currency) is about 12.0 percent for the 1975-97
period. The standard deviations in the year-to-year movements in inflation and output (relative to
the US) are much lower, at about 2.0 percent and 1.9 percent respectively. Experimental
simulations indicated that these values were broadly consistent with a standard deviation for the
exchange market innovation of 9.7 percentage points, for the inflation innovation of
1.3 percentage points, and for the output innovation of 1.1 percent.
To illustrate the model’s properties, Figure 1 shows impulse responses for standardized
innovations in each disturbance. In the face of a temporary exchange market shock, the exchange
rate depreciates by 9 percent in the first period. This raises inflation by almost 1 percent, and
17 The long-run depreciation of the nominal exchange rate under an inflation shock
reflects an increase in the domestic price level, which is not tied down under the Taylor Rule.
The real exchange rate returns to its initial level in the face of a temporary inflation shock.
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output by ¾ percent. Under the Taylor Rule, these movements in inflation and output cause the
short-term interest rate to rise by slightly over 1½ percentage points. In the second period the
shock dissipates and the exchange rate appreciates by about 8 percent, reversing the initial
increase in inflation and the short-term interest rate, while output declines toward its baseline
level. The exchange rate appreciation in the second period occurs in spite of a higher lagged
short-term interest rate, implying the opposite response to that predicted by UIP. This reflects the
rise in the lagged exchange market shock, which generates a perverse short-run correlation
between the lagged interest rate and the next-period change in the exchange rate. From a
low-frequency perspective, though, the effects of the exchange market shock show little
persistence. This is reflected in the muted response of the long-term interest rate (defined here as
the 5-year bond yield), which increases by only ¼ percentage point in the first period before
returning close to baseline in the second.
An inflation shock causes the short-term interest rate to rise by roughly the same amount
in the first period as an exchange market shock. The exchange rate initially appreciates in
response to higher interest rates, followed by depreciation in subsequent periods, as implied by the
well-known “overshooting” model of Dornbush (1976).17 In all periods after the first period
(when the shock hits), the relationship between the change in the exchange rate and the lagged
interest rate is consistent with UIP, in contrast to the situation with an exchange market shock.
The long-term interest rate also initially rises by much more, indicating that the inflation shock has
greater persistence in its effects on short-term interest rates. This difference is important, because
it implies a greater covariance between the long-term interest rate and the future change in the
exchange rate under an inflation shock than under an exchange market shock. This, in turn, puts
greater weight on comovements in interest rates and exchange rates that are UIP-consistent at
longer horizons.
Similarly, an output shock causes short- and long-term interest rates to rise on impact,
while the exchange rate initially appreciates followed by subsequent depreciation. Although the
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changes in interest rates are not as large as under an inflation shock, the results are qualitatively
similar—long-term interest rates rise by much more than with an exchange market shock, which
again results in more weight being placed on UIP-consistent movements in the data at longer
horizons.
To confirm the intuition provided by the impulse response functions, stochastic
simulations were performed on the model. Each simulation was performed over a 140-year
horizon, with the first 30 and last 30 years being discarded to avoid contamination from
beginning- and end-point considerations. This yielded a “sample” of 80 observations for each
simulation. This process was repeated 50 times to generate a hypothetical population of 50 such
samples. For each sample, standard UIP regressions were run using horizons varying from 1 to 10
years. The results of the 1-year and 5-year regressions for a representative population of 50
simulations are shown in Table 5.
The most prominent feature of the results is the difference in the slope parameters between
the regressions at the 1-year horizon versus those at longer horizons. For the 1-year regressions,
the average slope parameter of -0.50 is the same order of magnitude as those obtained in Section
II using data for the G-7 countries. Given the average standard error of 0.42, it would easily be
possible to reject the hypothesis that $ equals unity with a high level of confidence in the typical
sample. In both the 5-year and 10-year regressions, the average estimated $ is 0.82, with a
standard error of only 0.18. Thus, one could reject the hypothesis that $ equals zero at
conventional confidence levels, but not generally reject the hypothesis of unity. These results are
generally consistent with the pooled regressions using long-horizon data reported in Section III.
There are large outliers in some of the samples, however. The short-horizon coefficient ranges
from -1.37 to 0.37 across samples, indicating the variability in estimation results that could be
obtained using samples even as long as 80 periods. The 5-year results are somewhat more tightly
clustered, ranging from 0.53 to 1.32. For both the short- and long-horizon regressions, the
average standard error of $ found in individual samples is similar to the standard deviation
calculated across the 50 samples, suggesting that the calculated standard errors in the regressions
are indeed good estimates of the sample variability of the coefficients.
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Another interesting comparison between the regressions involves the adjusted R2 statistics.
The average value in the 1-year regressions is only 0.01, indicating a virtual complete lack of
explanatory power, similar to the regressions using actual data. For the 5-year regressions, in
contrast, the average value rises to 0.21, with some draws as high as 0.46. Again, this is
consistent with the stylized facts from the actual long-horizon regressions reported above. Thus,
even in the context of a model whose structure is unchanging over time and where agents are
assumed to have fully rational expectations, interest differentials do not explain the bulk of the
variance in longer-term exchange rate movements. This reflects the influence of future innovations
that are inherently unpredictable in affecting the future exchange rate path.
Figure 2 illustrates the pattern of the slope coefficients at alternative horizons for three
different populations of simulations. They yield very similar results, with the average slope
coefficients  ranging from -0.4 to -0.5 at the 1-year horizon, but becoming significantly positive at
horizons of 2 years and more. Indeed, the 3-year horizon coefficients are quite close to the values
of 0.7–0.8 reached at 5- and 10-year horizons. It is also interesting to note that the coefficients do
not asymptote toward unity at these longer horizons, but rather stabilize at levels somewhat below
the value implied by the unbiasedness hypothesis. This reflects the diminishing—but
nonnegligible—role that exchange market shocks continue to play at longer horizons. The
implication is that it may be unrealistic to expect to find coefficients centered on unity in UIP tests
at any horizon, even in the absence of measurement errors in the data. These results are consistent
with those obtained using actual long-horizon data. Flood and Taylor estimate a coefficient at a 3-
year horizon of about 0.6, only slightly below that implied by the synthetic regressions. Our 5-year
results are actually somewhat more favorable to UIP than implied by the synthetic regressions, but
the coefficients differ by less than one standard deviation of the value estimated in the synthetic
regressions. Our 10-year results are only slightly below the synthetic value.
In terms of the consistency of the model-generated volatility of the main variables with
actual data, the following tabulation compares the mean results across the simulations with
average values across the G-7 countries for 1975-97:
18 This contrasts with McCallum’s model, which requires the assumption of serially
correlated exchange market shocks to generate serial correlation in interest rates, even though
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Note: “^” denotes a variable expressed relative to the US. For the
actual data, the sample statistics refer to the 1975-97 period.
The model replicates closely the observed volatility in the actual data, although the
simulated standard deviations of changes in output and long-term interest rates are somewhat
lower than the averages observed for the G-7 countries. It is interesting to note that changes
in short-term interest rates exhibit similar volatility in the simulations as in the observed data,
even though no explicit interest rate shock is incorporated in the model. In addition, the
correlation of short-term interest rates with their lagged values is very similar in the
simulations to that in the actual data, in spite of the fact that an “interest-rate smoothing” term
is not included in the reaction function and the model’s innovations are serially uncorrelated.
This reflects the propagation over time of uncorrelated innovations via the lagged dependent
variables in the inflation and output equations.18
The somewhat lower simulated variance of the long-term interest rate compared with
the actual data may reflect the absence of error terms (i.e. risk premia) in the term structure
equations, contrary to empirical evidence (see McCallum (1994b)). To check the sensitivity of
the results to this assumption, simulations were preformed with additional stochastic
19 The standard deviations of the disturbances were calibrated to raise the standard
deviation of the year-to-year movements in the long-term (10-year) bond yield to match that
in the observed data, i.e. 1.1 percentage points.
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disturbances added to the term structure relationships.19 The short-horizon estimation results
were virtually unaffected by this addition, while the slope parameters in the long-horizon
regressions declined modestly—for instance, the average value of $ in the 5-year regressions
fell from 0.82 to 0.78, while that at the 10-year horizon fell from 0.78 to 0.68. This is not
surprising, as the term premium introduces what amounts to an error in the regressor in the
long-horizon regressions. For conventional reasons, this source of noise would bias the
estimated coefficient toward zero. But the magnitude of the effect is modest in the simulations
and the estimated parameter remains similar to those obtained with actual data.
Thus it appears that a small, forward-looking macroeconomic model with a
conventional structure is capable of explaining important stylized facts relating to tests of UIP.
The failure of UIP over short horizons is consistent with the endogeneity of interest rates in
the face of disturbances in exchange markets. Over the longer term, in contrast, the model’s
“fundamentals” dominate and UIP performs better. This interpretation is consistent with the
finding in Mark (1995) and Chinn and Meese (1995) that short-horizon movements in
exchange rate are dominated by noise while longer-term movements can be related to
economic fundamentals. 
Nevertheless, this framework cannot explain another major puzzle—the source of the
disturbances in exchange markets required to generate the observed volatility in exchange
rates. It is well known that conventional consumption-based asset pricing models are unable
to generate risk premia of the magnitude required to explain observed price fluctuations, not
only in exchange markets, but in almost all financial markets. More recent analyses based on
“first-order” risk aversion, such as Bekaert, Hodrick, and Marshall (1997), also generate risk
premia that are far smaller than the shocks observed in the data. Beyond this, it has also
proved difficult to relate ex post exchange risk premia to macroeconomic factors. It appears
that alternatives to approaches based solely on agents’ aversion to consumption risk are
needed to explain the stylized facts of predictable excess returns in asset markets.
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V.  CONCLUSIONS
We find strong evidence for the G-7 countries that the perverse relationship between
interest rates and exchange rates is a feature of the short-horizon data that have been used in
almost all previous studies. Using longer horizon data, the results of standard test of UIP yield
strikingly different results, with slope parameters that are positive and closer to the
hypothesized value of unity than to zero. These results confirm the earlier conjectures of
Mussa (1979) and Froot (1990) that the unbiasedness proposition may better apply at longer
horizons.
The difference in the results is shown to be fully consistent with the properties of a
conventional macroeconomic model. In particular, a temporary disturbance to the uncovered
interest parity relationship causes the spot exchange rate to depreciate relative to the expected
future rate, leading to higher output, inflation, and interest rates. Higher interest rates are then
typically associated with an ex post future appreciation of the exchange rate at short horizons,
consistent with the forward discount bias typically found in empirical studies. Over longer
horizons, the temporary effects of exchange market shocks fade and the model results are
dominated by more fundamental dynamics that are consistent with the UIP hypothesis. The
model, though, cannot explain why such shocks are as large as needed to explain observed
exchange rate volatility.
Regardless of the reasons for the failure of the unbiasedness hypothesis at short
horizons, from an unconditional forecasting perspective, the conclusion remains that interest
differentials are essentially useless as predictors of short-term movements in exchange rates.
Over longer horizons, however, our results suggest that interest differentials may significantly
outperform naive alternatives such as the random-walk hypothesis, although it is still likely to
explain only a relatively small proportion of the observed variance in exchange rates.
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Table 1.  Estimates of $
Maturity
__________________________________________________
Currency 3 mo. 6 mo. 12 mo.
Deutschemark -0.646* -0.861** -0.581***
(1.160) (0.839) (0.682)
Japanese yen -3.440*** -3.387*** -2.996***
(0.998) (0.783) (0.706)
U.K. pound -2.036*** -1.963*** -1.268**
(1.211) (1.176) (1.062)
French franc 0.273 0.269 0.491
(1.010) (0.920) (0.889)
Italian lire 1.462 1.847 1.994
(0.858) (0.795) (0.647)
Canadian dollar -0.516*** -0.535*** -0.464**
(0.589) (0.391) (0.477)
Panel1 -0.507*** -0.568*** -0.321***
(0.405) (0.390) (0.423)
Notes: Point estimates from the regression in equation 1 (serial correlation robust standard
errors in parentheses, calculated assuming k-1 moving average serial correlation). Sample for
3, 6, and 12 month maturity data is 1980Q1-1998Q1. * (***)[***] Different from null of
unity at 10%(5%)[1%] percent significance level. Source: Meredith and Chinn (1998). 
1 Fixed effects regression. Sample period: 1980Q1-1997Q4.
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Table 2.  Long-Horizon Tests of Uncovered Interest Parity
Panel 2.a:  Benchmark Government Bond Yields, 10-Year Maturity
(MA(39)-adjusted standard errors in parentheses)
           ^            ^  Reject      
" $ H0: $ = 1 R$2
German deutschemark -0.008*** 0.829 0.424
(0.002) (0.147)
Japanese yen -0.039*** 0.487 *** 0.197
(0.004) (0.101)
U.K. pound 0.005 0.567 *** 0.447
(0.004) (0.104)
French franc -0.007 0.885 0.027
(0.020) (0.508)
Italian lira1 0.008 0.214 *** 0.009
(0.007) (0.155)
Canadian dollar 0.000 1.104 0.145
(0.007) (0.657)
Constrained panel2 ... 0.635 *** 0.654 ...
(0.111)
Notes: Point estimates from the regression in equation 1 (serial correlation robust standard
errors in parentheses, calculated assuming k-1 moving average serial correlation). Sample for
is 1983Q1-1998Q1. * (***)[***] Different from null of unity at 10%(5%)[1%] percent
significance level. 
1 Sample period for the Italian lira limited to 1987Q1–1998Q1.
2 Fixed effects regression, excluding the lira. Sample period 1983Q1 - 1997Q4.
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Table 2.  continued
Panel 2.b:  10-Year Government Bond Yields
(MA(39)-adjusted standard errors in parentheses)
           ^            ^    Reject     
" $ H0: $ = 1 R$2
Deutschemark -0.009*** 0.836 * 0.468
(0.002) (0.128)
Japanese yen -0.038*** 0.564 ** 0.213
(0.005) (0.146)
U.K. pound -0.003 0.719 *** 0.446
(0.004) (0.109)
Constrained panel 1 ... 0.708 *** 0.695
(0.090)
Notes: Point estimates from the regression in equation 1 (serial correlation robust standard
errors in parentheses, calculated assuming k-1 moving average serial correlation). Sample for
is 1983Q1-1998Q1. * (***)[***] Different from null of unity at 10%(5%)[1%] percent
significance level. 
1 Fixed effects regression. Sample period: 1983Q1-1997Q4.
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Table 2.  (continued)
Panel 2.c:  5-Year Government Bond Yields
(MA(19)-adjusted standard errors in parentheses)
           ^            ^ Reject    
" $ H0: $ = 1 R$2
German deutschemark 0.002 0.914 0.066
(0.016) (0.360)
U.K. pound 0.002 1.084 0.011
(0.010) (0.415)
Canadian dollar1 0.008 1.337 0.157
(0.007) (0.410)
Constrained panel2 ... 1.010 0.396
(0.344)
Notes: Point estimates from the regression in equation 1 (serial correlation robust standard
errors in parentheses, calculated assuming k-1 moving average serial correlation). Sample for
is 1983Q1-1998Q1. * (***)[***] Different from null of unity at 10%(5%)[1%] percent
significance level. 
1 Sample period for Canada limited to 1985Q4–1998Q1 (44 degrees of freedom).
2 Fixed effects regression. Sample period 1986Q1 - 1997Q4.
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Table 3. Johansen Cointegration Test Results
Panel 3.a: 3 Month Horizon
LR *0 *1 M1 M2 j
Deutschemark 10.10 0.028 1.051 2.232 0.005 4
(0.021) (0.804) (0.047)
[2.778] [0.108]
Japanese yen 26.76** 0.028 1.006 3.477 0.370 2
(0.004) (1.025) (0.095)
[3.392] [3.901]
U.K. pound 19.36** -0.006 1.015 2.772 0.177 3
(0.012) (1.030) (0.073)
[2.692] [2.438]
French franc 14.84 -0.266 0.851 -0.798 -0.018 4
(0.180) (0.260) (0.028)
[3.069] [0.650]
Italian lira 18.95** 0.362 1.050 1.355 0.322 10
(0.038) (0.665) (0.131)
[2.038] [2.451]
Canadian dollar 10.43 0.013 1.056 1.003 0.154 3
(0.026) (0.544) (0.070)
[1.843] [2.196]
Notes: LR is the likelihood ratio for the Maximal Eigenvalue test of the H0 of zero cointegrating
vectors against HA of one cointegrating vector. 15.41 and 20.04 are the 5% and 10% critical
values (Osterwald and Lenum, 1992). Point estimates from Johansen maximum likelihood
procedure. j is the number of lags in the VAR representation of the cointegrated system. Sample
for is 1980Q1-1998Q1. * (***)[***] Different from null of unity at 10%(5%)[1%] percent
significance level. 
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Panel 3.b: 5 Year Horizon
LR *0 *1 M1 M2 j
Deutschemark 1 12.73 0.699 2.008 -0.037 0.045 8
(1.274) (0.019) (0.020)
[1.939] [2.243]
U.K. pound 2 14.15 0.281 0.477 -0.173 0.025 13
(0.233) (0.067) (0.146)
[2.573] [0.172]
Canadian dollar 3 -- -- 1 -0.058 -0.075 5
(0.028) (0.047)
[2.077] [1.585]
Notes: LR is the likelihood ratio for the Maximal Eigenvalue test of the H0 of zero cointegrating
vectors against HA of one cointegrating vector. 15.41 and 20.04 are the 5% and 10% critical
values (Osterwald and Lenum, 1992).  Point estimates from Johansen maximum likelihood
procedure, standard errors in parentheses, absolute values of the t-statistics in brackets. j is the
number of lags in the VAR representation of the cointegrated system. 
* (***)[***] Different from null of unity at 10%(5%)[1%] percent significance level. 
1 Sample is 1980Q1-98Q1.
2 Sample is 1978Q1-98Q1.
3 Sample is 1987Q1-98Q1. Long run unbiasedness imposed in Horvath-Watson regression.
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Table 4.  Simulation Model
Uncovered interest parity:
)s et,t%1 ' î t & 0t
Monetary reaction function:
î t & B̂t ' 0.5 (B̂t % ŷt)
Inflation (B) equation:
B̂t ' 0.6 B̂t&1 % (1&0.6) B̂
e
t,t%1 % 0.25 ŷt % 0.1)(st & p̂t) % <t
Output (y) equation:




t) % 0.5 ŷt&1 % ,t
Price level (p) identity:
p̂t ' p̂t&1 % B̂t
Exchange rate (s) identity:
st ' st&1 % )st
Long-term expected interest rate:
î
l,e









Long-term expected inflation rate:









Note: ^ denotes a variable expressed relative to the US.
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Table 5.  Regression Results from Stochastic Simulations
                                                                                 Regression horizon:                                           
                    1 year          5 years                   10 years
Estimated slope coefficient ($)
Average -0.50 0.82 0.78
Maximum 0.23 1.32 1.21
Minimum -1.37 0.53 0.30
Standard deviation 0.37 0.17 0.21
Standard error of $
Average 0.42 0.18 0.18
Maximum 0.53 0.22 0.22
Minimum 0.31 0.14 0.14
Standard deviation 0.04 0.02 0.02
Adjusted R2
Average 0.01 0.21 0.19
Maximum 0.08 0.46 0.44
Minimum -0.01 0.06 0.03
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Figure 1.f: U.K. pound
Figure 1. Recursive Coefficients for 3 Month Horizon
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Figure 2. Estimated Slope Parameters from UIP Regressions at Different Horizons 
    Using Data From Stochastic Simulations 
Horizon in years 
Estimated slope parameter  
1 2 3 4 5 10
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
Population 1
Population 2
Population 3
